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THE FIDUCIARY OF THE FUTURE
I
T HE seventeenth century was quite sure of itself. The cul-
tural and territorial conquests of the Renaissance had,
by then, been largely consolidated, and a solid feeling of
achieved importance ran through the veins of Spaniard,
Frenchman, and Briton alike. It was an age of balanced and
well-polished absolutisms, exemplified by le Roi Soleil, by
Descartes, by Leibniz, Spinoza, the Stuarts, and decapitant
Roundheads. Everyone was quite sure of his principles, quite
immune from the poisonous virus of relativism. Far from
being "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought," one rel-
ished gloatfully the intoxicating nectar of everlasting certi-
tude. And if, in that charming century, you longed for the
utmost pinnacle of rightness, the Pelion-on-Ossa of unim-
peachable axioms, you could ask a passing London solicitor
of what in the wide world he was surest. And he might very
well reply-that a corporation could not be a trustee.1
If ever a doctrine rested on a firm theoretical rock, if
ever a principle of law seemed destined immortally to endure.
this was that principle, this that doctrine. The reasons
assigned were as diverse as they were convincing; yet from
each it followed as the night the day, that a corporation
could not be seized to a use, could not be a trustee. An inspec-
tion of these reasons and their ultimate fate should prove a
terrible object-lesson for those who yet believe that any
proposition can long withstand the inexorable march of social
utility.
The most ancient reason for disqualifying a corpora-,
tion was a sort of corollary to the ecclesiastical officium
of the Chancellor. The Chancellor was the legal advocate
of men's souls, his court a forum of conscience. He sub-
pcenoed their better natures to his presence, and issued his
decree with the full sanction of absolute religion. A corpora-
1 Fulmerston v. Steward (1554), Plowden, p. 103; Chudleigh's Case (1589-
1595), 1 Co. Rep., f. 122a; Sanders on Uses (5th ed.), II, 27n; 1 Cruise, Digest.
340; Perry on Trusts, sec. 42. Is a pun between "soul" and "sole" involved?
See 168 L. T. 299 (October 19, 1929).
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tion being devoid of soul, how then could the Chancellor,
supervisor of souls, call it to account? It could not even take
an oath for the faithful performance of its trust. Clearly, a
corporation could not be a trustee.2
If the first reason stressed the spiritual aspect of Chan-
cery, the second emphasized its less pleasant concerns. The
Chancellor enforces his decree by sending the disobedient to
jail. Now, who can shackle a body corporate or imprison an
impalpable creature of the law? Equitable remedies are com-
mendably flexible, but they do not include the miraculous. 3
The third reason assigned to forbid corporate trustee-
ship was the staid doctrine of ultra vires: "A corporation
cannot be seized to a use, because their capacity is to a use
certain; again, because they cannot execute an estate without
doing wrong to their corporation or founder."4 The sound-
ness of this rationale strikes the eye: a corporation, being a
mere creature of statute, has such powers only as the sover-
eign has seen fit to confer.5 Though the rest of the general
rule has long crumbled into dust, this facet remains intact.
Trust functions are jealously reserved by legislatures to trust
companies and are denied to other corporations; 6 and, in at
least one state, even trust companies are disqualified from
acting as executor, administrator, guardian or committee.7
The question is one of local public policy."
Still a fourth ground finds mention in Bacon: "chiefly
because of the letter of this statute [of Uses] 9 which, in any
clause when it speaketh of the feoffee, resteth only upon the
word, person, but when it speaketh of cestuy que itse, it add-
eth person or body politic. 1 ° And so every consideration,
2Croft v. Howel (1578), Plowden, p. 538; Abbot of Bury v. Bokenham
(1539), Dyer, f. 8b.Croft v. Howel, supra Note 2.
'Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, Readings Upon the Statute of Uses,
Discourse III, p. 57.
'Matter of Ciotto, 105 App. Div. 143, 93 N. Y. Supp. 970 (1905); Vidal
v. Girard's Exs., 2 How. (1844). 127. See Am. Law Inst. Trusts Restatement
(Tentative Draft No. 1). sec. 92.
"E.g., Consolidated Laws of New York, Banking Law, secs. 185, 223.
'Public Laws of New Hampshire (1926), ch. 264. sec. 13.
'Woodbury's Appeal, 78 N. H. 50, 96 Atl. 299 (1915). The question of
according banking privileges to trust companies has also been a source of con-
siderable concern. See Jenkins v. Neff. 186 U. S. 230, 22 Sup. Ct. 905 (1901)
Laws of New York (1893), ch. 696; (1892), ch. 689.
'27 Hen. VIII, cap. 10 (1536).
"
2Readings Upon the Statute of Uses. supra Note 4.
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whether spiritual or temporal, analytical or interpretative,
led irresistibly to the conclusion that a corporation could not
be seized to a use, could not be a trustee. Thus, the seven-
teenth century solicitor.
Now, the eighteenth century was wholeheartedly icono-
clastic, if anything. Whatever its predecessor had set up, it
upset with peculiar gusto. In law, as in politics and the
gentler arts, the fetiches of the past were summarily guillo-
tined. No doubt, the observer of that audacious epoch could
readily appreciate the significant role of corporations in the
drama of conquest and exploitation which occupied the Brit-
ish stage. The East India Company alone was enough to
befriend Englishmen to the corporate device, while, across
the Channel, French purses smarted poignantly of the Mis-
sissippi Bubble. So that there should have been no great
amaze in London when milord Chancellor, out of a clear sky,
declared that "nothing was clearer than that corporations
might be trustees."'" So much for souls, prisons, and the
language of the statute.
The court of equity had no doubt queried: is it more
valuable to the cestui que trust to rely upon the responsibil-
ity and continuity of the corporate trustee, or should he pre-
fer the meager solace of believing that an unfaithful individ-
ual trustee is damned in soul and, sometimes, if caught
within the jurisdiction, imprisoned in body? In other words,
is it better to have the trust performed or to avenge oneself
for its non-performance? This consideration was pregnant
with more logic than a thousand scholastic syllogisms, and
has universally prevailed. The trust company is the expres-
sion of a growing demand for affirmative results, as op-
posed to a quite human, but rather impractical, longing for
retribution.
In the United States, as in England, this attitude has
spread with unbelievable acceleration. A r~sum6 of that
growth follows. For the moment, it is enough to point out
that the corporate trustee, forbidden by every rule of law and
"Attorney-General v. Landerfield, 9 Mod. 286 (1744). Holdsworth com-
pares this decision to Daimler Co. v. Continental Tire & Rubber Co., 2 A. C.
307 (1916), where a British corporation was held a public enemy by reason of
possessing an enemy charter. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol.
IX, p. 52.
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logic, came into being because men needed and wanted it.
And what men need and want sufficiently, they will have,
ruat colur.
II
The trust company is not only the youngest member of
the banking family: for a long period after its birth, it
enjoyed no independent existence, but must needs develop
under the regis -of insurance, safe-deposit, and even canal-
digging functions! But let us start at the beginning, so that
this astonishing history may speak for itself. In as much as
all early corporate ventures were instituted by special legis-
lative fiat, the "Statutory Record of the Unconsolidated Laws
of New York" will prove a worthy guide.
We find the first New York bank founded on March 21,
1791-the "Bank of New York." 12 Shortly thereafter, insur-
ance companies are organized--"United Insurance Company
in New York City,' 1 3 "Mutual Assurance Company of New
York City,"'1 4 "New York Insurance Company. ' 11 By 1819,
we have a savings bank-"The Bank for Savings, in New
York City."'16
But the eye must wearily traverse some 569 pages of the
titles of unconsolidated laws before it rests, with a grateful,
if somewhat befogged, glance, upon the first corporation
whose name includes that familiar phrase - "trust com-
pany."'1 7 The initiator was the "New York Life Insurance
and Trust Company," founded on March 9, 1830, some thirty-
nine years after the first State bank. It will thus be seen
that the nomenclature "trust company" is now exactly one
hundred years old,-a mere infancy as financial institu-
tions go.
Laws of New York (1791), ch. 37; the Charter of Bank of New York
drafted by Alexander Hamilton in 1784.
- Laws of New York (1798), ch. 41; (1805), ch. 10; (1813), ch. 86;
(1816), ch. 80.
' Laws of New York (1798), ch. 46.
- Laws of New York (1798), ch. 71; (1800), ch. 84; (1808), ch. 33;
(1818), ch. 95; (1838), ch. 130.
" Laws of New York (1819), ch. 62.1 Laws of New York (1830), ch. 75.
, 35
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But the germs of corporate trusteeship had taken life a
few years before the appearance of this definitive form. In
1818, the "Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company
of Boston, Massachusetts" was incorporated, upon a pros-
pectus that stressed trust powers of a limited nature.1 8 The
company did a flourishing business, and eventually aban-
doned all attempts at writing life insurance. It is not to be
supposed, however, that trust functions in general were exer-
cised by this corporation. Its service was rather like that of
an investment-trust, each beneficiary receiving a proportion-
ate share of the entire income of the company. 19 This seems
to have been the first example of the investment-trust device,
and became sufficiently popular to warrant emulation by
several contemporary corporations. 2
0
The first explicit legislative grant of trust powers took
place on April 16, 1822, the recipient being "The Farmers
Fire Insurance and Loan Company," of New York, which
was invested with full authority to act as trustee, under
supervision of the Court of Chancery.2 1
In New Jersey, trust powers were soon bestowed upon
"The Morris Canal and Banking Company of New Jersey." 22
These and other ventures of the sort gained an impetus from
the interest incident to the incorporation of "The New York
Life Insurance and Trust Company." A special committee of
the Legislature, appointed to investigate the propriety of
granting the petition of the incorporators, analyzed the ad-
vantages involved in corporate trusteeship, briefly as follows:
1. Fraud and incompetence of individual trustees.
2. The migratory character of the people of the United
States, requiring trustees to look after property, and render-
ing individuals unsuitable for trust duties.
" Laws of Massachusetts (1817), ch. 180. See James G. Smith, Trust
Companies in the United States, pp. 213 et seq. This volume is an invaluable
collection of trust company history, practice and statistics.
"T. R. Jencks. Life Insurance in the United States, Hunts Merchants'
iVlagazine, vol. 8 (February and March, 1843), pp. 109-131, 227-240.
'James G. Smith, supra Note 20 at 261.
' Laws of New York (1822), ch. 50. See Senate Journal of New York,
45th Session, 1822. pp. 1059-1060.
' Charter Laws of New Jersey (1824), pp. 158-171.
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3. Complication of investment problems, due to rap-
idly changing property values.
4. Financial security and stability of corporate
fiduciary.
5. Immortality of corporate fiduciary.23
The outcome was the incorporation of the first "trust
company," eo nomine. In the first eight months of its exist-
ence, nearly one and a quarter million dollars were depos-
ited with "The New York Life Insurance and Trust Com-
pany," in trust. These deposits seem to have been of the
investment-trust category; but there were also (in 1833)
court trusts aggregating 5243,163.85, and two guardianships
of infants in England with assets of $11,172.67.24 The trust
company in its modern sense had come-to stay.
But the growth, though impressively sure, was slow and
gradual, jealously supervised by state banking authorities
and legislative committees. Many petitions for incorporation
were flatly denied. 2 i As a result of this critical attitude,
although New York could boast of a "free" banking law as
early as 1838,28 no blanket statute authorizing the exercise
by corporations of trust functions was passed until 1883,27
and none permitting the general incorporation of trust com-
panies until two years later.2 8 The trust company, offshoot
of insurance, safe-deposit and-other extraneous activities, is
certainly the youngster of the financial family.
But, if ever a youngster lustily grew and developed and
prospered, this is that youngster. One is constrained to mini-
mize statistical illustration, for almost any mensural ap-
proach reveals the same startling expansion. For instance,
Legislative Documents of the Senate and Assembly of New York, 53rd
Session, 1830, vol. II, Doc. 84, pp. 3-7.
"Statement, New York Life Insurance & Trust Company.
'Documents of the Assembly of New York, 1833, vol. III, no. 209. Laws
of New York (1834), ch. 250; Assembly Journal of New York, 1834, pp.
121-122. E. T. Perrine, The Story of the Trust Companies, pp. 37-46.
'Laws of New York (1838), ch. 260.
'Laws of New York (1885), ch. 425.
'Laws of New York (1887). ch. 546.
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the following are the respective appointments of trust com-
panies as executors during the last seven years:
1923 .................... 5,899 1927 .................... 29,814
1924 .................... 7,878 1928 .................... 44,375
1925 .................... 12,926 1929 .................... 60,036 29
1926 .................... 19,128
At the end of June, 1929, there were 1,734 national banks
actively operating trust departments, an increase of 630, or
fifty-seven per cent. in three years. There are now approxi-
mately 3,400 corporate trust organizations in the United
States! 30
The insurance-trust field is one in which the welding of
two related, but entirely disparate, devices has led to astound-
ing results. In 1927, $257,000,000 of life insurance was placed
in trust with corporate fiduciaries; in 1928 an additional
$700,000,000; and, in 1929, an additional $1,200,000,000! 3 1
This is an outstanding example of a genuine social con-
tribution by the trust company. The insurance trust is prob-
ably the most practical of all devices for the simple, efficient
and economical administration of estates.3 2 Aside from its
advantages from the standpoint of inheritance taxation,33 it
combines all of the salutary features of life insurance with
the solidity and flexibility of trust service. To this thesis,
the figures above furnish sufficient commentary.
It is interesting to note the parallel which the develop-
ment of corporate trusteeship in England bears to that in
the United States. In England, too, the first corporate bodies
to perform fiduciary services were not specialized trust com-
panies, but rather the great life insurance companies. One
- Proceedings, Trust Company Division, American Bankers Association
(1930), p. 3.
' Id., p. 3; see Trust Companies Magazine, vol. XLVIII, pp. 861, 869;
vol. XLIX, pp. 450, 518; vol. L, pp. 199, 727, 801.
"' Proceedings, supra Note 29 at 18-21. Trust Companies Magazine, vol.
XLIX, pp. 641-644. These and the foregoing statistics are partial only, as not
all of the trust companies have furnished reports of business transacted. Pro-
ceedings, s=pra Note 29 at 4.
" Matter of Haedrich, 134 Misc. 741, 236 N. Y. Supp. 395 (1929); aff'd
on opinion below, 230 App. Div. 763 (N. Y. Law Journal, July 26, 1930);
Matter of Hartman, 126 Misc. 862. 866, 215 N. Y. Supp. 802 (1926).
'Matter of Haedrich, supra Note 32. But see Laws of New York (1930),
ch. 710, sec. 249 (r), 9.
THE FIDUCIARY OF THE FUTURE
of these has conducted a trust business for a full century,
with present aggregate trust assets of £100,000,000.34 It was
not until 1908 that the Midland Bank created a subsidiary'
(Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Company, Ltd., Man-
chester, England) to enter this field. Its success has been
quite remarkable, which may in part be attributed to the
reasonableness of its fees. These are, roughly, one-half of one
per cent. of the gross value of the estate and three-quarters
of one per cent. of the net income, after deduction of taxes.5
Other members of the "Big Five" have followed suit.3 6
III
Now, just what are the implications of this development?
What does it seem to predict? We see throughout the land a
large number of great administrative machines, grinding
out, year by year, an increasing number of estates and
trusts. These machines are not haphazard devices, temporar-
ily adapted to trust service. They are especially designed
and erected for that sole function. Their parts are endlessly
readjusted, their methods everlastingly modified, better and
ever better to fit the needs for which they were built. What
"P. D. Willcock, Fiduciary Service as Performed by the Trust Corpora-
tions in England. Proceedings, supra Note 29 at 116-117.
'Ibid. at 118. See Prentice-Hall, Trusts, Current Section, p. 9455,
par. 10209.
" 168 L. T. 299 (October 19, 1929). Here the advantages of corporate
trusteeship are outlined in much the same manner as by the New York
legislative committee, supra Note 23. The fees prevalent in England are,
approximatly:
Acceptance Fee
Value Fee
£1,000 110
5,000 25
10,000 43.75
20,000 81-25
50.000 137.50
Withdrawal Fee
Value Executorships Trusts
1,000 .025 .01
5,000 .007 .005
10,000 .006 .0043
20,000 .0055 .0042
50,000 .0023 .0028
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private artisan, skilled though he be, can turn out work so
rapidly, so uniformly, so efficiently?
Let us compare what has lately occurred in a closely
related field-that of bankruptcy, another situation in a
man's history when the law takes his goods into its custody,
administers and then distributes them. In January, 1929,
after the irresponsibility, ineptitude, and, in many cases,
flagrant dishonesty of individual receivers could no longer
be tolerated, the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York, following the experiment of other
districts, selected a trust company to act as official receiver.
A huge organization was set up to liquidate bankrupt estates,
and experts and specialists were engaged to devote their
entire time to this one pursuit. The results have been so
gratifying that individual receivers are no longer within the
realm of possibility."
To carry the analogy still closer-England, in 1906,
created the office of Public Trustee, a department of the state
to which the administration of trusts could be committed.
The success of this new departure has been extraordinary, f6r
the Public Trustee is now administering more than 16,500
trusts of an approximate total value of £190,000,000. Two
considerations have motivated Englishmen to avail them-
selves of this organization: first, the reasonableness of the
statutory fees; and, second, the security offered by state
support. 8
It is noteworthy that the office of Public Trustee was
created two years before any of the large English banks had
entered the trust field. Had not the British trust companies
been so tardy in inception, no such intervention by the gov-
ernment would have been necessary. A Public Trustee in this
country, in the same sense as in Great Britain, would be quite
supererogatory. The growth of trust company business in the
United States demonstrateg that the requisite organizations
are already in existence and are functioning smoothly.
Trust Companies Magazine, vol. XLIX, p. 304; Proceedings, supra
Note 29 at 46.
' Proceedings, supra Note 29 at 117, 164 L. T. 195 (September 17, 1927);
161 L. T. 470 (June 12, 1926). Public Trustees Act (1896), 59 and 60 Vict.,
ch. 35 as amd. by 6 Edw. 7, ch. 55 (1906).
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The reader has, no doubt, largely anticipated the point
of the argument-that is, that the American trust companies
should be made public trustees. In fine, the distribution of
estates is so charged with a public interest that society may
rightfully compel every testator and every settlor to select a
fitting trust organization for this purpose. There seems no
persuasive reason why next of kin or legatees are entitled
to less honest, less efficient, less responsible liquidation of
estates than creditors in bankruptcy. And, if it be objected
that the intention of the testator is frustrated by such an
enactment, the reply must be that his desires are rather
enforced than thwarted by the thorough and expeditious
administration of his estate. His money goes whither he
willed it, not into the sloughs of inefficiency, ignorance, and
slothful delay.
The above is not to be construed as a proposal that
individual co-fiduciaries be precluded. In many situations
the appointment of an individual co-executor or co-trustee is
highly desirable, and confers a definite benefit upon the
cestuis que trustent. Often the testator's attorney, by reason
of his professional knowledge and experience and his per-
sonal contact with the members of the family, can invest the
administration of the estate with a warm, human intimacy
not otherwise obtainable. In other cases it may prove advis-
able to nominate a business, partner, in order to capitalize
his technical expertness. No derogation from this time-
honored custom is here advocated. It is urged, however, that
one executor (or one trustee) must be a corporation pos-
sessing financial responsibility and the machinery of fiduci-
ary administration.
The proposed innovation would, strikingly enough, be in
line with the ancient evolution of executorship into its pres-
ent form. We have long abandoned the concept of the execu-
tor as heres testamentarius, the instituted heir. Now the
executor is a mere liquidator, the trustee a mere anchor to
windward 3 9 These functions should be referred to the fittest
to perform them. The resulting practical benefits will out-
weigh the theoretical millstones, upper of which is the tes-
" Schouler, Wills, Executors and Administrators (6th ed.), vol. 3, secs
1492 et seq.; Domat, Le Droit Civil, secs. 3330-3332.
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tator's arbitrary whim, and nether the longing of individuals
for the emoluments of trusteeship.
One more analogy must be called upon to hush the reac-
tionary protest. The proposed scheme is but a return, after
many centuries, to the earliest method of administration.
Far from being novel or radical, it may lay just claim to
hoary antiquity in the chronicle of British law. Blackstone's
account 40 is :
"In case a person made no disposition of such of
his goods as were testable, whether that were only part
or the whole of them, he was, and is, said to die intes-
tate; and, in such case it is said that, by the old law,
the king was entitled to seize upon his goods, as the
parens patriee, and general trustee of the kingdom.
This prerogative the king continued to exercise for
some time by his own ministers of justice. * * *
Afterwards, the crown, in favor of the church, invested
the prelates with this branch of the prerogative: which
was done, saith Perkins, because it was intended by
the law that spiritual men are of better conscience
than laymen, and that they had more knowledge what
things would conduce to the benefit of the soul of the
deceased. The goods, therefore, of intestates were
given to the ordinary by the crown; * * * in trust to
distribute the intestate's goods in charity to the poor,
or in such superstitious uses as the mistaken zeal of
the times had denominated pious. And, as he had thus
the disposition of intestate's effects, the probate of
wills, of course, followed: for it was thought just and
natural, that the will of the deceased should be proved
to the satisfaction of the prelate, whose right of dis-
tributing his chattels for the good of his soul was
effectually superseded thereby."
But
"the popish clergy took to themselves the whole res-
idue of the deceased's estate, after the partes rationa-
biles, or two-thirds, of the wife and children were
" Commentaries, II, 493-496.
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deducted; without paying even his lawful debts, or
other charges thereon.4 1 For which reason, it was
enacted by the statute of Westminster 2, that the
ordinary shall be bound to pay the debts of the intes-
tate so far as his goods will extend: a use more truly
pious than any requiem, or mass for his soul."
Eventually, by statute, the ordinaries were directed to
appoint administrators, to be "the next and most lawful
friend ' 42 of the intestate. This was interpreted to mean his
next of kin.43 Thus was born the administrator of the pres-
As has been seen, in early England, the crown seized
upon the goods of the deceased and administered them, as
"general trustee of the kingdom." Here is surely ample prec-
edent for the designation of carefully supervised administra-
tive machines as general trustees of the citizenry. Blackstone,
too, would agree that the preservation and protection of
estates is a pious use.
Before passing on from this hypothesis, we might note
one or two of its direct implications. In the first place,
the standard of trust performance would be unquestionably
raised, if only because chancellors subconsciously (and quite
logically) require superior fidelity and thoroughness of a
large financial institution to that of an individual business-
man.4 4 The latter is harassed by his own affairs, frequently
inexperienced in the delicacies of trust accounting, and all
too often perched 'twixt rival horns of some embarrassing
legal dilemma. The former, on the contrary, is trained not
to make mistakes, and is able to compensate the injured when
it does. A trust department will inevitably be required to
exceed the standard of care and judgment of the man in the
'Cf. Fleta, 1. 2, ch. 57, sec. 10; Gloss of Pope Innocent IV, Decretales,
1. 5, tit. 3, ch. 42.
"231 Edw. III, ch. 11 (1358).
'Hensloe's case, 9 Rep. 39, Trin. 42 Eliz. Reg.
"Matter of Clark, 136 Misc. 881, N. Y. Supp. (1930). The con-
cept of the restriction of specific functions affected with a public interest to
exercise by supervised corporations is by no means novel. Witness commercial
bankers, insurance companies, public utility corporations, etc. Under sec. 111 of
the New York Decedent Estate Law, only trust companies or title guaranty
corporations can be trustees on certain mortgages, if the same are to be accep-
table as "legals." An obvious instance in most jurisdictions is the Public
Administrator, a type of corporation sole.
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street. It must devote more attention, more efficiency to the
cestui's concerns than to its own.
In the second place, the trust company will be compelled
to accept many small, even unprofitable trusts. The poor
man also has his rights; he too is entitled to a quick and
thorough administration. To the cestui of modest means,
the proposed plan should prove a genuine boon. And to the
trustee, it will not be over-burdensome, in view of the in-
creased number of wealthy trusts receivable. Ubi beneficium,
ibi onus. Moreover, it is clear that some reasonable means
could be devised to simplify and cheapen the liquidation of
small estates.
To recapitulate-the trust company is properly charged
with a public service. 4" The process of administration would
be rendered simpler, cheaper, safer for all if every estate
were imperatively subjected to the same catalysis. Social
utility requires an expedition of the process by which the
dead hand enfeoffs the living.
MURRAY L. JACOBS,
EDMOND NATHANIEL OAHN.
New York City.
'That the thesis herein advanced reflects a factual trend, is attested by
Surrogate Wingate of Kings County, New York, in a decision involving the
right of executors to double commissions: "When it is realized that this fidu-
ciary relationship is being more and more centered in an ever-diminishing
number of large corporations, the consequent effects upon the future of the
state and nation and the rights and fortunes of our citizens are worthy of the
most careful study and critical analysis. These observations are in no way to
be construed as a disparagement of the valuable contribution made by corporate
fiduciaries in the administration of estates or the propriety of adequate recom-
pense to 'them for services performed." The same decision recognizes the
interest of the polity in an expeditious and inexpensive administration of
decedents' estates: "Every testator relies upon the surrogate in the first instance,
and the higher courts, if occasion requires, to see to it that his property, after
his death, is made available, without improper diminution, for his family or
named beneficiaries." Matter of Kings County Trust Company (Florence
Fletcher Jackson, deceased), 84 N. Y. L. J. 376, October 21, 1930.
